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CHILD SUPPORT LAW AND POLICY: THE
SYSTEMATIC IMPOSITION OF COSTS ON WOMEN
NAN D. HuNTER*
From 1970 to 1981, the number of divorces in the United States
more than doubled, and the number of children living with one parent
increased by fifty-four percent, to a total of 12.6 million children,
or one child in five.1 The great majority of these children have a
living noncustodial parent from whom they are entitled to receive
support payrents.2 Thus, approximately twenty percent of the
nation's children are involved- at least potentially-in the child sup-
port system. Yet, despite its growing reach, the child support system
remains in many ways primitive and inchoate. Award amounts are
inadequate to pay for even half the cost of childrearing.3 Wide
disparities exist in the standards utilized to set the amounts,4
leading to a general public perception that the system is irrational.5
Procedures for the enforcement of support orders range from ade-
quate to nonexistent.6
*Staff Attorney, Reproductive Freedom Project, American Civil Liberties Union Founda-
tion, New York; B.A. 1971, Northwestern University; J.D. 1975, Georgetown University Law
Center.
This Article will appear in substantially similar form in FAMIIS, PoLrrcs AND PUBUC PoLicY
(I. Diamond ed. forthcoming July, 1983).
1 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF CoMmERcE, BURAnu or TH CENsus, MARITAL STATUS AND Lvmo
ARRANOEMENTS: MARCH 198i, Series P-20, No. 372, at 1, 5 (table D) (1982) [hereinafter cited
as MAuTAL STATUS A" LrvNo ARRANGEmENTS].
2 Approximately two percent of American children live with a parent who is widowed. Id.
at 3 (table D).
3 See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 28-31, 47-71 and accompanying text.
s One commentator has suggested that widespread disparities lead to the phenomenon of
almost every divorced mother knowing another mother who receives more in child support
from a father who earns less than her ex-husband, and almost every divorced father knowing
of a man who earns more and pays less. I. GARrNKEL, Cmm SUPPoRT: W tEAKNsEs OF THE
OLD AIM FEATURES OF A PROPOSED NEw SysTEm (1982) (available from the Institute for Research
on Poverty, University of Wisconsin).6 See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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Although the criticism of child support policy is widespread,'
there is little explicit recognition that the policy issues involved are
vastly different for women than for men. Such a grossly flawed system
does more than just lower the standard of living of millions of
children; it also imposes on women a disproportionate share of the
costs of raising children. As of 1978, 7.1 million women in the United
States were single mothers living with their children! More than
ninety percent of all children who live with only one parent live with
their mother. 9 Mothers with custody pay well over half of the costs
of childrearing, because the support amounts ordered from the fathers
are low to begin with, and because payments are usually irregular,
if made at all.'0 Perhaps the most dramatic single fact is that forty-
one percent of all custodial mothers are awarded no child support
at all from the father." Among Black and Hispanic women,
seventy-one percent and fifty-six percent, respectively, never receive
a child support award. 2 The hardship for Black women is
aggravated by the fact that divorce rates for Blacks are higher than
for whites or Hispanics. 3
'See, e.g., Foster, Freed & Midonick, Child Support: The Quick and the Dead, 26
SmRAcusn L. REv. 1157 (1975); Weiner, Child Support: the Double Standard, 6 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 1317 (1978); White & Stone, A Study of Alimony and Child Support, 10 FAM.
L.Q. 75 (1976); Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support Cases: An Empirical Study of
the Establishment and Enforcement of Child Support Orders in the Denver District Courts,
57 DmCVER L.J. 21 (1979).8 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENsus, CHIL SUPPORT AND ALIMONY:
i9s8, Series P-23, No. 112, at 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as CHILD SUPPORT AND ALi.tONY: 1978].
MARirA. STATUS AND LVING ARRNGEMENTS, supra note 1, at 1. Throughout this Article,
"mother" is used to denote the custodial parent and "father" to denote the absent parent.
Although "custodial parent" and "absent parent" are gender-neutral terms, the choice of
"mother" and "father" is intended to reflect the fact that child support is not a gender-neutral
issue.
10 In 1978, the mean annual child support amount for those women who actually received
support was $1,800, or $150 per month. Child support represented about twenty percent of
their mean total income of $8,944. This annual figure, broken down by number of children,
yields mean monthly amounts of $100 for one child; $164 for two children; $210 for three
children; and $230 for four or more children. These monetary computations exclude the three
out of every ten women who, after being formally awarded child support, were receiving
nothing. CHIL SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1978, supra note 8, at 1, 5. In a much smaller sample
drawn from other nationwide data, Judith Cassetty found that the average annual child sup-
port payment actually made in 1974 was $539. J. CAssLa'm, CIm SUPPORT AND Ptuc PoLicY:
SECURING SUPPORT FROM ABSENT FATHERS (1978); see also D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS
PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHID SUPPORT 42-59 (1979).
" CHIn SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1978, supra note 8, at 5 (table B).
12 Id. at 1.
13 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENsus, MARITAL STATUS AND Liv-
ING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1979, Series P-20, No. 349, at 7-8 (table I).
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the turn of the century.' 4 The traditional rule was that the father
had ajproprietary right to his child's labor and services and a reciprocal
duty to support the child during the marriage.' 5 Some jurists be-
lieved that he should be relieved of both if the mother gained custody
upon divorce.'6 While Blackstone described the father's duty to pro-
vide maintenance for his children, irrespective of custody, as "a prin-
ciple of natural law,"' 7 three family law commentators have
observed:
If it was such a principle, it was a moral duty without adequate
legal remedy, although ecclesiastical courts perhaps lent their
authority as a matter of conscience to force fathers to discharge
their natural duty, and in chancery a quasi-contractual duty of
support eventually became equitable doctrine.'8
By the 1920's, courts had ceased to treat the child as an item of prop-
erty, and the father's obligation to continue providing support after
divorce was established as a matter of law.'9 Once it was resolved
that the father had a duty to provide for his children after divorce,
the law often required that the duty be solely his, generally because
of the mother's presumed inability to earn a sufficient income.'
In practice, however, then as now, much of the support was not
paid.2' A 1948 survey of families in Detroit, for example, found
that the divorced wife "receives relatively little property from the split
of joint possessions, is given very little child support, and in two-
fifths of the cases does not receive this support regularly.",
" For some examples of early cases establishing as law the duty of a divorced father to
support his children, see Ward v. Goodrich, 34 Colo. 369, 82 P. 701 (1905); Rounds Bros.
v. McDaniel, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S.W. 956 (1909); Alvey v. Hartwig, 106 Md. 254, 67 A. 132
(1907).
"See, e.g., State v. Langford, 90 Or. 251, 176 P. 197 (1918).
"Oliver Wendell Holmes, then on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, wrote
that the duty of the father to support a child living apart from him and with the mother depended
on whether the mother's separation from her husband was justified. Baldwin v. Foster, 138
Mass. 449, 453 (1885). A contemporaneous legal treatise concluded that fathers were liable
only for the "bare maintenance" of children in their mother's custody. G. FPILDs, TaM LEGAL
RELATIONS OF INFANTs 61 (1888).
17 1 W. BLAcKsTOaN, Cowm:EtNAxsms ON TEE LAWS OF ENGLAN) 434-37 (1966 ed.).
"8 Foster, Freed & Midonick, supra note 7, at 1157 (footnotes omitted).
19 See J. SCOULER, A TREATISE ON ran LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIvoRcE, SEPARATION AND
Dom=snc RELATIoNS 856 (1921).
2' See Weiner, supra note 7, at 1318; see also Bill v. Bill, 155 Ind. App. 55, 290 N.E. 2d
749 (1972) (traditional view has been that wife's separate income and assets are irrelevant).
2! See J. ScHouLR, supra note 19, at 880-85.
22 W. GOODE, ArTER DIVORCE 222 (1956).
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Nonetheless, the misperception arose that divorced fathers actually
did provide the full support for their children, while mothers enjoyed
a windfall.' Today, virtually all child support statutes provide that
both parents have the same duty to provide support. 2
The role of the legal system since the turn of the century has been
to adopt policies that purport to establish and enforce child support
but succeed only in hiding the widespread reality of paternal non-
support. Thus it functions in an unarticulated but systematic way
to force women to assume the financial responsibility for
childrearing-responsibility that belongs to both women and men.
Though child support law is facially neutral, in practice its profound
economic effects are directly tied to gender 35 It is women who pay
the bulk of the costs that result when one household becomes two.
This Article first examines the legal processes by which child sup-
port amounts are established and enforced. The first section addresses
both the private family system of child support and the social "safe-
ty net" program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children. The
Article then analyzes how the child support system as a whole func-
tions to privatize the costs of divorce, to impose these costs on women,
and to reinforce both women's economic dependence on men and
the social pressure on women to marry. The final section of the Article
discusses proposed reforms, in light of the criteria necessary both
to establish equitable standards for a child support system and to
empower women.
I. THE SYSTEMS OF CHILD SUPPORT
The care and support of children is treated by the American legal
system as an almost entirely private concern. For so long as a mar-
23 The prevailing assumption of male support is reflected in the assessment of proposed
model divorce legislation made by the coauthor of a major text on family law: "There is less
support for the proposition that the divorced wife should bear separate and equal respon-
sibility for support of the children; yet most commentators would refuse to absolve the wife,
and I would urge the Conference to impose upon her an equal support obligation." R. LEVY,
UNFORM MARRIAGE AND DrvORcE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANLYsIs 205 (1968) (paren-
theses omitted).
24 See H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 4-5 (1981).
25 See infra notes 39-46, 101-114 and accompanying text.
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riage continues, unless the situation degenerates into one of
neglect,' child support decisions are left within the realm of each
nuclear family.' It is only when one parent leaves or never joins the
household unit that an amount of support, and thus a standard of
care, may be determined for a given child. It is in the course of divorce
and paternity proceedings that courts ascertain whether a duty of
support exists, and if so, how much is owed.
The support obligation is established through the public mechanism
of the courts, but the amount is generally determined on an
individualized basis, according to how the judge hearing the case
evaluates each family's situation. The law recognizes no bench-
mark figure for what constitutes an adequate amount to raise a child.
The statutes which govern child support typically provide for an
amount that is "reasonable and just" or that is based on a list of amor-
phous criteria, such as the financial resources of each parent, the
needs of the child, and the child's previous standard of living.29
A few jurisdictions have adopted uniform tables of suggested amounts
or formulae for setting amounts, 30 but most parties obtaining a
divorce do not know how much child support will be ordered until
26 For a legal definition of "neglected child," see, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(f)
(McKinney 1975).
2 See H. KRAuSE, supra note 24, at 10.
28 See H. CLAnx, THE LAW op DosmsTic RELATiONS 496 (1968); see also infra note 29.
29 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, for example, provides:
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, maintenance, or child
support, the court may order either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child
to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for his support, without regard to marital
misconduct, after considering all relevant factors including:
(1) the financial resources of the child;
(2) the financial resources of the custodial parent;
(3) the standard of living thq child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been
dissolved;
(4) the physical and emotional condition of the child, and his educational needs; and
(5) the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent....
UNiT. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 309, 9A U.L.A. 167 (1967). For more on the vagueness
and discretionary character of standards governing child support, see also J. AaaaN, FAmLY
LAW: CAsES AND MATERmALs 630-36 (1978); H. KRAUSE, supra note 24, at 15 ("It]he national
picture thus remains one of great diversity, divergence and confusion"); Freed & Foster, Divorce
in the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 F m. L.Q. 229, 258 (1981); White & Stone, supra note
7, at 83.
30 See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
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the court rules.' Although a court hearing a divorce action has the
power to divide property and award spousal support in addition to
ordering child support, such relief is atypical. Only forty-five per-
cent of divorced women receive a property award of any size," and
only fourteen percent are awarded spousal support. 3 Thus for the
majority of women, child support is the only financial adjustment
made at the time of divorce.
There is one partial exception to the privatized nature of the child
support system. The program of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) is the social backup system for parents who are
unable to provide even subsistence-level support for their children."
Almost all of its adult recipients are women -typically mothers who
are divorced or separated from, or have never been married to, the
fathers of their children.35 The amount of a monthly AFDC pay-
ment is determined by the number of dependent children, based on
a schedule set by state regulation in conformity with federal
statute?6 In New York, for example, the basic monthly welfare
grant for a family of four in 1982, excluding rent, was $258. 3' As
this Article shows," this low level of benefits is but one of many
problems in the AFDC program which gravely undermine its value
as an alternative to the privatized system.
The standards for amount and the procedures for enforcement dif-
fer greatly between the private family system and the AFDC system.
What the two systems share is a pervasive disregard for the rights
and economic security of custodial mothers.
A. The Private Family System
It is hard to overstate the extent of the post-divorce child support
31 This Article concerns support amounts set through adjudication, although parties fre-
quently negotiate a support amount between themselves. See H. CLARK, supra note 28, at
497. Negotiated amounts are not likely to be more predictable than adjudicated amounts,
since settlements often depend in large part on how much each party's attorney believes a
judge would award. For a description of other factors influencing expectations in support
settlement negotiations, see I. GARFINKEL, supra note 5, at 2.
32 CH= SUPPORT AND AijmONY: 1978, supra note 8, at 11 (table F).
" Id. at 10 (table E).
'4 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-665 (West 1970 & Supp. Dec. 1982).
35 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.
346 (102d ed. 1981).
36 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a) (West 1970, 1978 & Supp. Dec. 1982).
N N.Y. Soc. SERv. L. § 131-a (2)(a) (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1982-1983).
38 See infra notes 81-100 and accompanying text.
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crisis in the United States. Judith Cassetty reported that, in 1974,
families composed of women and children received child support
payments which totaled far less than one-half of the amount
designated as the poverty level that year for those families. By con-
trast, ninety-three percent of the fathers making the payments earned
incomes that were at least twice the poverty level for their current
families. 9 Lenore Weitzman and Ruth Dixon found that the
amount of child support awarded in Los Angeles in 1972 was only
half the amount needed to raise children in low-income families at
1960 to 1961 prices and that it amounted to no more than twenty-
five percent of the father's net income ° A study of child support
practice in Denver found that two-thirds of the fathers were ordered
to pay less for child support than they reported spending on monthly
car payments.4
Because women are the custodial parents in the overwhelming
majority of cases,42 it is almost always women who petition a court
for child support. They confront all the difficulties accruing to the
plaintiff in a civil action,43 while seeking funds to provide for their
children's basic necessities. But unlike many other plaintiffs, they
cannot easily eliminate expenses to minimize financial losses during
the pendency of litigation. Even a request for support pendente lite
may face a lengthy court backlog,' and the smart attorney for the
father may try to delay the hearing date so as to pressure the finan-
cially strained mother to accept an immediate, but relatively low,
support offer.
In order to initiate the process, the mother must retain an attorney
unless she meets the income eligibility guidelines for Legal Services
or similar assistance. But in evaluating whether she is entitled to free
legal aid, Legal Services offices often attribute to the wife her hus-
band's income, even if the the couple is separated and the husband
contributes no child support.45
39 J. CAssEmTT, supra note 10, at 103.4
o Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns for
Child Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 473,497-99(1979).
" The average father for whom data was available paid $136.97 per month for his car and
$113.59 per month for his 1.6 children. Yee, supra note 7, at 36.
42 See supra text accompanying note 9.
43 For a discussion of the particular difficulties confronting women who seek to sue to
collect back child support-including the frequent reluctance of private attorneys to take these
cases-see J. CAssamTY, supra note 10, at 106.
" In situations where there is no issue of paternity and thus no question about the underly-
ing duty of support, the use of formulae or tables could virtually eliminate the need for time-
consuming and expensive hearings in most child support cases.
45 Woods, The Challenge Facing Legal Services in the 80's, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE Ray. 26
& n.2.
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The burden of meeting expenses while litigating child support cases
in the court system falls heavily, often exclusively, on women, since
women almost always have custody of the children.6 Even a
woman who is accustomed to a comfortable level of income because
of her husband's earnings can suddenly find herself in a financial
crisis if her husband cuts off the amount he has been spending for
support of the children. On the other hand, without prompt and
effective mechanisms to ensure that needed support transfers do not
lapse, the father will benefit from the delay.
Domestic relations courts in different jurisdictions have varied
widely in the methods they employ to determine support amounts.41
A few state appellate courts have acknowledged the confusion and
unpredictability that result from the vagueness of the present criteria,
and have adopted formulae. Irrespective of whether a formula or
a conclusory standard is in use, however, almost all courts begin their
determination of how much support is due by computing the costs
of rearing the particular children before the court.49 After
establishing these costs, the court normally proceeds to allocate be-
tween the parents responsibility for these expenses.
Most court systems now use a simple cost-division system, basing
awards on information supplied by parents about the children's
expenses and the net earnings of each parent." The judge will
usually use this information to calculate a figure said to represent
a reasonable share of child support expenses for the particular father
to pay, considering the father's salary. Unofficially, many judges have
adopted a "cap" on child support amounts, above which they almost
never go."
In jurisdictions in which tables have been adopted setting specific
support amounts according to the father's income, the rationale for
'5 See supra text accompanying note 9.
47 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
48 E.g., Hamilton v. Hamilton, 57 N.C. App. 40, 290 S.E.2d 780 (1982) (recommending
that trial courts use formulae); Smith v. Smith, 290 Or. 675, 626 P.2d 342 (1981); see also
examples set forth in H. KRAusE, supra note 24, at 12-14.49 See supra note 29.
5" See Cassetty, Emerging Issues in Child Support Policy and Practice, in THE PARENTAL
Cm'LD SUPPORT OBLIGATION: REsEARcH, PRACTICE AND POuCY 3 (3. Cassetty ed. 1983).
51 Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property,
Alimony and Support Awards, 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 1181, 1234 (1981); see also H. KEAUsE,
supra note 24, at 15; Yee, supra note 7, at 30.
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the suggested amounts is presumably that a certain percentage of the
father's income should go to child support. Although unstated, such
a system necessarily assumes an underlying fixed cost for care of the
child or children. Under this system, neither the amount of costs
actually needed to raise the particular children nor the extent of the
burden placed on the mother is considered. The advantage is that
the amounts are predictable, and this predictability decreases litiga-
tion and its attendant expenses.
The use of these cost-sharing principles disadvantages custodial
mothers by using as the starting point the minimal amount on which
she and the children can subsist. An alternative is an income-sharing
or equalization principle, which would seek to equalize the financial
burden of one household becoming two, so that each family member
would experience roughly the same proportional reduction in lifestyle
as a result of the readjustment.' 2
Whether the central principle used to set child support amounts
should be based on cost-sharing or on income-sharing is one of the
major debates now engaging economists and social workers active
in the child support field. 3 Critics of income-sharing argue that
those formulae provide an incentive for custodial mothers to avoid
paid employment, and oppose income-sharing as an improper
extension of marital financial commitments beyond the point of
divorce.14 Income-sharing advocates respond by pointing out that
there is no universal standard for the "cost" of a child;55 cost can-
not be determined except by reference to the economic status of the
parents."
52 The first methods for allocating the costs of child-rearing between divorced parents on
an equalization principle were proposed by Isabel Sawhill. I. Sawhill, Developing Normative
Standards for Child Support and Alimony Payments (Feb. 1977) (Urban Institute Paper),
described in J. AREEN, supra note 29, at 653-54; and in J. CAssarnm, supra note 10, at 133 n.15.
53 For a good discussion of the policy aspects of income-sharing versus cost-sharing, see
Tim PARETAL CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION, supra note 50.
4 E.g., Bergmann, Setting Appropriate Levels of Child Support Payments, in Tm
PARENTAL CHIL SUPPORT OBLIOATION, supra note 50, at 116.
5 E.g., Cassetty, supra note 50, at 5.
5 6This criticism directly reflects the privatized nature of the child support system. The clear
class basis of child support is one of the reasons that courts so consistently produce disparate
awards. Judges customarily award support for one ten year old at $200 per month and for
another at $1000 per month; that the "needs" of a janitor's child may be assessed as a fraction
of those of a lawyer's child is an accepted part of the system. See generally H. CLA K, supra
note 28, at 496; Ames v. Ames, 59 Cal. App. 3d 234, 130 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1976) (support duty
extends beyond furnishing mere necessities, to include maintaining child in style and condi-
19831
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Although the cost-sharing method may satisfy a general
reasonableness standard, it is quite possible for a child support award
to be "reasonable" as an amount which the father can afford and
the mother and child can subsist on, and also to be an inequitable
reallocation of limited resources. A division of costs will almost always
result in the mother-children household unit living on a lower post-
transfer income than the single father household; most child sup-
port awards produce for the mother and children a minimal amount
to defray expenses, and for the father, a relative increase in disposable
income. 7
The cost-sharing approach raises other questions: whether a cost
figure should be based on the expenses actually incurred for the child
or on the amount which would have been spent had the marriage
not dissolved; whether the value of personal services rendered by the
custodial parent should be included in costs; how a costs approach
can anticipate expenses for emergencies; and how to account for
children needing more expensive items as they grow older. An income-
sharing model would accommodate these concerns and be more likely
to produce child support awards which equalize the relative well-being
of each household.
The criteria utilized by most courts typify a simple cost-sharing
principle, insofar as the emphasis is on the child's needs and the
parents' ability to pay." The lack of uniformity even within this set
of methods is illustrated by the chart below, which displays the results
of applying seven different systems to the same set of facts. The first
six are based on variants of a cost-sharing approach. The results
demonstrate the enormous disparities in the amounts that would be
awarded by different courts for the same family. The chart is based
on a hypothetical middle-class family in which the father earns a net
monthly income of $1400; the mother earns a net monthly income
of $815; and there are two children, ages five and ten, both in the
custody of the mother.
tion consonant with parents' social position); Kotkin v. Kerner, 29 A.D.2d 367, 288 N.Y.S.2d
244 (1968) (support duty of affluent parents includes continuing private school education for
children). Indeed, even within the same family, there is likely to be a difference in the economic
status of parents, at least insofar as that status is based on earnings.
57 See infra notes 106-112 and accompanying text.
58 See Bruch, Developing Normative Standards for Child-Support Payments: A Critique
of Current Practice, in Tm PARENTAL CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION, supra note 50, at 119-32.
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Source of Method Used to
Calculate Amount Monthly Support Amount
Franks System
(cost-sharing) 9  $364.53
Delaware State Guidelines
(cost-sharing proportional
to parents' incomes)60 $399.10
American Bar Association
Family Law Section (percentage
of income for support depends
on number of children)6' $408.50
Pennsylvania Guidelines (fixed
percentage of income for sup-
port depends on number of
children)62  $466.00
Los Angeles Guidelines (fixed
amounts set by table)63  $575.00
Oregon Formula
(fixed formula)" $585.83
Eden System
(income-sharing)5  $602.95
59 Franks, How to Calculate Child Support, CAsE & COmmENT, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 3. To
arrive at the amount in the table, we assumed that the father had visitation for 87 days per
year: roughly 30 days in the summer plus alternate weekends and holidays.
60 Delaware Child Support Formula (Melson Formula), Family Court of the State of
Delaware, (June 1980) (unpublished report).
61 Bair, How Much Temporary Support is Enough?, 1 FAmriy ADVOCATE 37, 41 (Spring
1979).
62 Scale of Suggested Minimum Contributions For Support by Absent Parents, Interim
Statement of Pennsylvania Child Support Enforcement Program, 3 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 3101
(1977).
63 Los Angeles County Superior Court, Family Law Dept., Guidelines for Initial Order to
Show Cause, (July 1, 1977) (notice to attorneys).
" Smith v. Smith, 290 Or. 675, 626 P.2d 342 (1981).
65 Eden, Forensic Economics- Use of Economists in Cases of Dissolution of Marriage, 17
Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 345 (2d ed. 1978); P. EDEN, ESTMATING CI AND SPousA. SUPPORT
(1977).
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The method that leads to the smallest amount deserves special note.
Maurice Franks, who proposes a variant of cost-sharing, is also the
author of How to Avoid Alimony.' Franks' method begins with a
computation of child support divided proportionately between the
parents according to income. He then subtracts from that an amount
calculated to represent what the non-custodial parent spends on the
child during visitation, based on the number of days per year he sees
the child. The subtraction is made regardless of the mother's income.
Most courts have denied motions by fathers to decrease their sup-
port obligations by claiming credit for money spent on the child dur-
ing visitation.67 Yet the Oregon Supreme Court in Smith v. Smith,"
while rejecting Franks' visitation credits, cited his article with approval
as a critique of current methods of determining support.69
The method in the chart that leads to the highest support amount
is the one developed by Phillip Eden, a forensic economist who bases
his figures on government data on the average cost of raising a child.
The final support amount is based on a formula which reduces by
the same percentage the amount each new household would need to
maintain the family's prior standard of living. The method is set up
to produce an equally shared burden between the two households,
on the assumption that neither can afford its previous lifestyle. Eden's
system is one of only a few proposals explicitly designed to equalize
the burden of dividing one household into two, so that each
adult and child suffers roughly the same level of downward
readjustment.
Much of the literature on child support has focused on the role
of uniform formulae in eliminating gross discrepancies in awards.1 '
6s M. FRANxs, How To Avom AUmoNY (1975). In this analysis of alimony, Franks opined
that "[t]he steel shackles and iron bars of bondage are every bit as real to the male slaves
of the twentieth century as they were to their black counterparts of the nineteenth." Id. at 10.
67 See, e.g., Young v. Williams, 583 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1978); Mackie v. Hurm, 5 Fain. L.
Rep. (BNA) 2946 (1979) (Del. Farn. Ct. Aug. 22, 1979); Williams v. Budke, 606 P.2d 515
(Mont. 1980). But with the trend to joint and shared custody, one can expect more men to
argue that their support payments should be reduced because they spend money directly on
the child. Custodial mothers might, thus, see already-low support amounts shrink even fur-
ther while their household expenses decrease very little. This inequity reflects the fact that
the original calculation, even if made proportionate to income, did not seek to leave the two
households in the same financial condition. A dollar for dollar subtraction merely compounds
the underlying problem.
290 Or. 675, 626 P.2d 342 (1981).
69 Id. at -, 626 P.2d at 346.
70 Although other commentators have proposed income-sharing principles, see supra note
40, this chart uses Eden's system because its calculations are more easily applied to the data.
7! See, e.g., White & Stone, supra note 7; Yee, supra note 7. Yee's study, however, found
that the adoption of guidelines in Denver courts did not eliminate major discrepancies in awards,
apparently because judges ignored the tables. One Denver father of two children was ordered
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The removal of such disparities is important, but the emphasis on
uniformity of amounts alone is an example of elevating procedural
fairness above substantive fairness. The implementation of univer-
sal formulae will not itself ensure an equitable result unless the
formulae are designed to produce amounts which equalize the finan-
cial burden between mothers and fathers. Within the private family
model, the central issue for women is the dollars-and-cents size of
the award. Unless uniform formulae are adopted with a specific goal
of equalization, they will serve only to freeze women in their cur-
rent role-of absorbing a disproportionate share of childcare costs.
The predictability that any uniform formulae might supply is, without
more, of limited value to women.
A second aspect of the child support crisis is the issue of enforce-
ment of awards. The Census Bureau found that, of all women who
had court orders entitling them to receive child support in 1978, only
forty-nine percent received the full amount, and on the average, thirty-
five cents out of every dollar owed for child support was never
paid.72 An examination of the standard procedures for payment
reveals why noncompliance is so commonplace.
When a father is ordered to pay child support, he is usually told
to send the mother a check every pay period. Keeping track of the
payments, or lack of them, is the mother's responsibility. Most courts
have a system for computerized record-keeping, but judges frequently
do not order that records actually be kept,73 especially for middle
and upper-middle class fathers, for whom it may be considered
embarrassing. And even when computerized records are kept, often
the failure to pay triggers no official response.74 Thus, it is up to the
to pay $120 a month out of a net salary of $450; another father of two was ordered to pay
.$SO a month out of a monthly net income of $900, or less than half the support amount out
of twice the available income. Yee supra note 7, at 53 (table 4).
7 CsmD SUPPoRT AND Aumoy: 1978, supra note 8, at 1, 8; see also 0. STmuEM & J. DAVIs,
DIVORCE AwARDs AND OuTrcoims: A STUDY op PAnmo.N AND CHANoE IN CUYAHIOGA CoUrNTY,
Oio 188 (1981).
73 Arkansas, for example, did not adopt a procedure for making payments through the
court clerk until 1981. Arkansas: Summary of 1981 Bills Signed Into Law, 7 Faro. L. Rep.
(BNA) 2509 (1981). Judges' resistance to ordering payment through a court registry is discussed
in Note, Enforcement of Maintenance and Support Under the Missouri Dissolution Act, 44
U.M.K.C. L. REv. 416, 432 (1976).7 4 Unlike the recordkeeping and enforcement systems in most states, which are "haphazard
at best," D. CHAmBms, supra note 10, at 10, Michigan has established a uniquely comprehen-
sive and effective "Friend of the Court" agency to monitor and enforce child support obliga-
tions. These county agencies supervise the child support awards for both welfare and nonwelfare
families. Their functions include receiving payments, remitting them to the custodial parent,
and keeping extensive and detailed records. For a discussion of this unusual program, see
id. at 10-15.
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mother to institute enforcement proceedings. It will not be worthwhile
for the mother to sue, however, until the support owed exceeds the
fee she will probably have to pay a lawyer to bring suit. By the time
it becomes worth it to proceed, her financial plans and budgeting
may be in turmoil. If the amount due builds up and the case does
get to court, judges in some states are permitted to adjust the amount
of arrearage retroactively if they believe the father cannot afford the
entire sum.7' The system thus provides virtually every incentive for
fathers not to pay.
The literature on child support is replete with ideas for improving
enforcement mechanisms. An increasing number of courts are using
automated record-keeping systems. Some of these systems include
automatic notice procedures, so that a father is at least contacted,
and perhaps summoned when a payment becomes delinquent.76 A
number of states have substituted administrative procedures for full-
scale court hearings for both the award-setting and enforcement
phases. 7 One commentator has studied the impact of using im-
prisonment for nonsupport as a deterrent." The greatest attention
has been paid to developing procedures for garnishments and
automatic wage withholding systems which would have the employer
deduct support payments from fathers' wages like a tax deduction,
and then send the support amount to the court. One proposal sug-
gests that a federal income withholding system be instituted to allow
support orders to follow the parent from job to job until the obliga-
tion ends.79 Another author has suggested a "federal floating wage
assignment," which would essentially be a nationwide garnishment
75 See, e.g., Dillow v. Dillow, 575 S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978); Emanuel v. Emanuel,
5 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2156 (D.V.I. 1978); Griffin v. Avery, 120 N.H. 783, 424 A.2d 175
(1980) (court has discretion to allow credit retroactively toward arrearage in certain cir-
cumstances, although cannot reduce total amount of arrearage that must be satisfied in some
fashion); Michalik, Divorce: Power of Court to Modify Decree for Support of Child which
wasBased on Agreement of Parties, 61 A.L.R.3d 657, 671-76 (1975). By contrast, in bankruptcy
law, child support obligations are among the few debts from which release cannot be obtained.
11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5) (West 1979 & Supp. 1982).
76 Chambers found that this self-initiating notification procedure was one of three variables
most substantially related to whether fathers paid the support amount due. D. CHAMBERS,
supra note 10, at 90-91.
'n U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COURT SYSTEMS PROCEDURES AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES To ESTABLISH AND ENFORCE CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS (1980).
78 D. CHAMBERS, supra note 10, at 165-253; see also Chambers, Men Who Know They are
Watched: Some Benefits and Costs of Jailing for Nonpayment of Support, 75 MICH. L. REv.
900 (1977).
'9 D. CHAMBERS, supra note 10, at 258-61.
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system, creating a uniform national remedy for violation of a sup-
port order.w°
Any proposal which succeeded in increasing child support enforce-
ment would benefit the majority of custodial mothers. All of these
ideas are refinements of judicial procedures, however, and none goes
beyond the legal system in the search for a better model. Each seeks
to improve incrementally the existing private family support system
rather than to build a cohesive social child-care policy. Even the pro-
posals for equalizing the costs of child raising between a woman and
a man in a given family fail to address the support problems of parents
who lack enough resources to divide.
B. The AFDC System
The program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children is the
second component of the American child support system. Initiated
in the 1930's primarily to provide for widows,8 AFDC became the
only alternative to the purely private family support system. Since
that time, the number of recipients has mushroomed, increasing by
225 percent during the 1960's and peaking in 1976.82 However nar-
row were the program's original goals, AFDC currently functions
to maintain some 10.5 million children and their mothers. 3 The
role of AFDC as a government-funded backup system must thus be
a major part of any discussion of child support reform.
Indeed it was a reaction to the increasing costs of AFDC and the
desire to cut back expenses, rather than social alarm over the plight
of mothers raising children with insufficient support amounts, that
led to most of the current attention to issues of child support
enforcement." The drive to decrease welfare expenses by collecting
' 
0 See Carrad, A Modest Proposal to End Our National Disgrace, 2 Fmy ADVOCA'AE 31
(Fall 1979).
81 See W. TRAT=na, FROm POOR LAW TO XVELFARE STATE: A HIsToRY OF SocIAi WELFARE
IN AmECA 185-87 (1979).
82 F. PwErN & R. CLOwARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE
341, 350 (1971); G. STnER, THE FuTnar OF FAmxy POLICY 113 (1981).
3 G. STmIER, supra note 82, at 113.
8 The words of Senator Russell Long of Louisiana, who, on the floor of the Senate,
advocated reform of the AFDC statute, illustrate the legislative intent behind its 1974
amendments:
Should our welfare system be made to support the children whose father cavalierly
abandons them-or chooses not to marry the mother in the first place? Is it fair to
ask the American taxpayer-who works hard to support his own family and to carry
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support from the absent parent was the basis of then-Governor
Ronald Reagan's welfare reform legislation in California in the early
1970's.1s A 1974 study by the Rand Corporation on nonsupport by
affluent fathers as a cause of welfare dependency was a starting point
for much of the later research on child support. 6 The relationship
between paternal nonsupport and the poverty of many unmarried
mothers and their children has been well established. 7
On the federal level, Congress responded by amending the AFDC
entitlement provisions to require that mothers cooperate with the state
in establishing paternity and obtaining support payments from fathers
as a condition of eligibility.8 Concern over the dangers to women
posed by the requirement of filing suits against physically abusive
fathers resulted in a compromise "good cause" exception which waives
the requirement to cooperate when the recipient can prove that there
is a reasonable likelihood of physical or emotional harm to her or
the child." The exception is rarely invoked succcessfully, 9' probably
because the "good cause" showing is difficult to make.9 The great
majority of women who receive AFDC have no choice but to name
the fathers and "cooperate" in locating and suing them. Loss of
privacy is the price of receiving benefits.' Thus, in contrast to
his own burden-to carry the burden of the deserting father as well? Perhaps we can-
not stop the father from abandoning his children, but we can certainly improve the
system by obtaining child support from him and thereby place the burden of caring
for his children on his own shoulders where it belongs. We can-and we must-take
the financial reward out of desertions.
118 CONo. REc. 8291 (1972), quoted in Katz, A Historical Perspective on Child-Support Laws
in the United States, in THE PARENTAL CMLD SUPPORT OBLGATION, supra note 50, at 19.
as Zumbrun & Parslow, Absent Parent Child Support: The California Experience, 8 FAM.
L.Q. 329 (1974).
86 M. Winston & T. Forsher, Nonsupport of Legitimate Children by Affluent Fathers as
a Cause of Poverty and Welfare Dependence (1974) (The Rand Corporation) (unpublished
report).
J. CAss=rr, supra note 10, at 23-27.
8842 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(26)(B) (West 1974 & Supp. 1978).
89 To qualify, emotional harm must be serious, demonstrable, and of such impact that it
substantially impairs the individual's functioning. 45 C.F.R. § 232.42 (1978).
90 In 1980, the Department of Health and Human Services reported 31,522 refusals to
cooperate, of which 2,830 evidenced good cause. 5 HHS OFFCE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCE-
mENT ANN. REP. table 27 (1980).
91 See supra note 89.
92 A classic description of the life of a welfare mother is that of Johnnie Tillmon, past presi-
dent of National Welfare Rights Organization:
The truth is that AFDC is like a super-sexist marriage. You trade in a man for the
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women not on AFDC, who are often unable to enforce child sup-
port orders because of the difficulty and expense involved in initiating
collection suits, women who do receive AFDC are forced into
intrusive prosecutions over which they have no choice or control.
The rights of both groups of women are effectively ignored.
From the traditional viewpoint of the best interests of the child,
many AFDC mothers may be the worst group to coerce into pur-
suing child support. Studies have found that many low-income Black
families rely on tight kinship bonds and unstructured mutual aid
systems to cope with the conditions of poverty;3 a requirement that
mothers cooperate with the state in securing paternal payments jeopar-
dizes these bonds and secondary support systems. Some poor children
receive material, psychological, and social support from their fathers
or, most likely, from their father's kinship network, despite his
absence from the home.94 If the father refuses to acknowledge the
child for fear of incurring legal obligations, the child may lose a form
of support which is arguably more significant than the amount of
public funds saved by decreasing the welfare budget. More recently
it has been suggested that the loss of a kinship network may occur
among low-income communities of a variety of racial and ethnic
identities.95 Presumably, the risk varies with each specific family,
depending on the nature of the interpersonal relationships, the prox-
imity of family members, and numerous other factors. The judg-
ment as to whether more will be gained or lost by seeking coerced
support should be left to the mother, and her decision should be
respected by the state.
man. But you can't divorce him if he treats you bad. He can divorce you, of course,
cut you off any time he wants. But in that case, he keeps the kids, not you.
The man runs everything. In ordinary marriage, sex is supposed to be for your hus-
band. On AFDC, you're not supposed to have any sex at all. You give up control of
your own body. It's a condition of aid....
The man can break into your house any time he wants to poke into your things.
You've got no right to protest. You've got no right to privacy when you go on welfare.
Tillmon, Welfare is a Woman's Issue, Ms. Magazine, Spring, 1972, Preview Issue, 111; see
also Glassman, Women and the Wetfare System, in SiSTERHooD Is Powr.arUL 102 (R. Morgan
ed. 1970).
93 See C. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURvIAL IN A BLACK CosimnnY (1974);
Stack, Extended Familial Networks: An Emerging Modelfor the 21st Century Family, in THE
FAmIJY IN PosT-INDusTRiAL AmERcA 49 (D. Snyder ed. 1979); Blaydon & Stack, Income Sup-
port Policies and the Family, 106 DAEDALus 147 (1977).
' C. STACK, supra note 93, at 50-54.
95 Rapp, Family and Class in Contemporary America: Notes Toward An Understanding
of Ideology, in Rmimnw TH= FAmELY: SomE FamST QuEsnoN s 177-79 (B. Thorne ed. 1982).
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Once a woman establishes AFDC eligibility, a variety of incen-
tives built into the law lock her into the system.' The statute
requires that the family grant be reduced dollar for dollar when there
is a private support award, and totally eliminated once any private
support award reaches the family's designated need level.97 Thus, it
is often to the advantage of recipients to collect only enough child
support from absent fathers to reduce, rather than eliminate the
family's AFDC payment. Private support sufficient to terminate
AFDC benefits also terminates other in-kind benefits-Medicaid,
for example-for which AFDC enrollment is an eligibility
requirement.98 This consequential financial loss can be substantial.
In addition, the unreliability of private child support creates a re-
volving door phenomenon, where recipients are terminated only to
reapply later, causing financial chaos for the families and higher ad-
ministrative costs for the program.9 Finally, the state welfare agen-
cy itself has an incentive to keep families on AFDC at reduced grant
levels, rather than to terminate the family altogether. Statistical
records showing dollar savings reflected in decreased grants, rather
than completely eliminated grants, reflect better on the agency, from
the standpoint of cost-effectiveness. 11 All these factors combine
powerfully to keep families on AFDC, once enrolled.
II. THE CHILD SUPPORT SYSTEM AS A MEANS
FOR THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF WOMEN
-The concept of the privatized, closed family system underlies all
American family law principles,' including those governing
intrafamily support. Until the point of destitution, when AFDC
9 The analysis in the text summarizes relevant portions of Cassetty, Program Conflicts and
Human Considerations, 37 PuB. WELFARE J. 33 (1979).
97 42 U.S.C.A. § 657(b)(1) (West Supp. 1982).
, See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SEav. LAW § 366 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1981); see also Cassetty,
supra note 96, at 34-35.
Cassetty, supra note 96, at 35.
'0o Id. at 35-36.
101 See generally Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimina.
tion Law, 1979 Wisc. L. REv. 5; Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination
and the Role of Law, in THE Poirircs op LAw 117 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Olsen, The Family
and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REy. (forthcoming
May 1983).
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intervenes, the individual family is expected to make its own internal
decisions about who in the family will receive which resources."
The "hands off" principle increases the control of the more power-
ful party in marriage-the husband-by failing to counterbalance
the various forms of social control that men in general have over
women. The general rule has been that during marriage a spouse has
no legal claim to more than minimal food and shelter. 3 The rule
has operated systematically to the detriment of women, in light of
the fact that it is the husband who is more likely to have a higher
earned income and uninterrupted full-time employment.' The in-
sulation of relationships within the nuclear family from the reach
of the law has always disadvantaged women:
By maintaining a world split into public and private spheres,
by denying women the right to participate in the public sphere
and then refusing to regulate the private sphere or deferring to
custom when compelled to regulate that sphere, the legal order
effectively excluded women from its operations and constrained
women to exist in a pre-modem world of customary law, a world
where personal conduct was determined by patterns of custom
and reciprocal expectations and where the distinction between
habit and duty becomes blurred and ill-defined." 5
The family support system, with its absence of legal remedies dur-
ing marriage and the privatization of child support after marriage
ends, exemplifies this public/private dichotomy. The system harms
women both because it systematically burdens mothers and relieves
fathers of the child support obligation, and because it forces individual
women to bear the brunt of a major social problem.
Income data on divorced men and women illustrates the extent
to which the current child support system maintains male economic
supremacy by failing to equalize the impact of divorce between the
102 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
" See McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953); Goldstein v. Goldstein,
271 Pa. Super. 389, 413 A.2d 721 (1979). For an analysis of the rule, see Grozier, Marital
Support, 15 B.U. L. R'v. 28, 33 (1935).
"o4 In marriages where both spouses worked full-time, the median share of family income
contributed by the wife was 37.6 percent. U.S. DEPT. op LABOR, BURE.AU OF LABOR STAzS'ncs,
PERSPECTVES ON WORmNG WoMEN A DATABOOK 57 (table 59) (1980).
105 Powers, supra note 101, at 77-78 (footnotes omitted).
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two parents.'" Just as the child support system penalizes women,
it directly benefits men. Custodial mothers experience a sharp drop
in their living standard and their disposable income after divorce,
but divorced fathers realize a financial gain. A father who is ordered
to pay one-third of his income for child support, for example, and
thus retains sixty-seven percent of his net earnings for discretionary
expenses, fares better financially than when he was married." 7
An examination of child support orders in Cleveland from 1965
to 1978 found that divorced fathers retained about eighty percent
of their pre-divorce income; the higher the man's earnings, the greater
the proportion of income he retained; in fact, the proportion of the
average father's income which was ordered for child support declined
between 1965 and 1978, especially for the more affluent men."0'
Weitzman's surveys of divorced men and women in Los Angeles
found that the households of divorced husbands had a per capita
income from one-and-a-half to three-and-a-half times greater than
the per capita income of the divorced wives' households; again the
disparity between husband and wife increased as the husband's income
increased.' ° Data from the University of Michigan's nationwide
sample indicated that eighty-six percent of divorced fathers were
economically better off than their former wives and children, and
more than sixty-four percent had income-poverty ratios" which
were two or more times greater than those of their former wives and
children."' In the Cleveland study, for example, divorced fathers
106 In addition to the studies discussed in the text, see Weitzman, supra note 51; Seal, A
Decade of No-Fault Divorce, 1 FAMIY ADVOCATE 10 (Spring 1979); and Stencel, Single-Parent
Families, in EDIToRLAL RESEARCH REPORTs ON THE CHANGING AMERICAN FAminy 63 (H. Gimlin
ed. 1979).
107 D. CimmBERs, supra note 10, at 48.1o G. STEmtN & J. DAvis, supra note 72, at 158. In 1965, fathers were ordered to pay an
average of 15 percent of their monthly gross income for child support. By 1978, that figure
dropped to 11.6 percent. Id. at 94-97.
109 Weitzman, supra note 51, at 1242-48.
..0 The income-poverty ratio measures the ratio of family or individual income to the pov-
erty level designated by the Social Security Administration for that number of persons. For
example, a four-person family with a 1974 income of $7000 per year would have an income-
poverty ratio of 1.5 because the S.S.A. poverty level for that size family was $4,680. See J.
CAssErTY, supra note 10, at 84 n.19.
11 J. CAssETTY, supra note 10, at 70-71. Using a sample base of almost 2.3 million
households, Cassetty found that absent fathers had income-poverty ratios twice as large as
those of the mother-children unit in 1,467,000 families, or sixty-four percent of the total sample.
By contrast, the same difference in favor of the mother-children unit was found in only 159,500
families, or approximately seven percent of the sample. Cassetty noted that separated families
measuring about the same in economic security numbered approximately 195,000, or 8.5 per-
cent of the sample.
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living alone were found to have from ten to twenty percent more
after-transfer income than the mother-children unit, and if only the
two parents were compared to each other, fathers had three times
as much (or three-hundred percent more) after-transfer income.11 2
Thus men as a class are the winners in the universe of child support
awards.
Increasing rates of divorce will, over time, lead to a major transfer
from men to women of the bulk of family care expenses (in addition
to family care labor). The child support system thus contributes to
the "feminization of poverty," or the massive shift of women-headed
households into the official zone of poverty." 3 This process
operates in tandem with broader economic discrimination against
women, reflected in women's earnings averaging fifty-nine percent
of men's earnings11
Among the most serious effects of the impoverishment of women
brought about by divorce is the reinforcement of women's economic
dependence on men. The primary route open in this society for women
to raise their standard of living is to marry, remain married, or
remarry."5 Indeed, married women are aware of the financial perils
accompanying divorce. One recent study of Michigan women, with
children, about to receive a divorce, found that twenty-nine percent
of those either unemployed or on welfare indicated that they wanted
to reconsider or to attempt reconciliation; only eight percent of full-
time working women expressed this desire." '6 Possessing a full-time
job, even given the discounted "woman's wage," may operate as a
functional threshold requirement for women to consider divorce to
be a viable option. Research has demonstrated an inverse relation-
112 G. STmuN & J. DAvis, supra note 72, at 160. This comparison included only those
mothers who had full-time jobs.
1' The median income of the woman-headed family is 48 percent of that of all families.
U.S. Bui Au OF nE CENsus, FAMIUBs MANTAN ED BY FE.LE HousEHoLDERS, 1970-1979,
Series P-23, No. 106, at 34 (table 17) (1980). In 1979, the poverty rate for Black families headed
by a woman was 49.2 percent, compared to 13.3 percent for those headed by a male. Among
whites, the poverty rate for families headed by a woman was 22.3 percent, compared to 9.1
percent for those headed by a male. U.S. BuREAu OF TH CE&sus, CaAR.Acmsncs oF TrE
PoPuLATioN BELow THE Pov-aTY LEvm.: 1979, Series P-60, No. 130, at 2 (table A), 14 (table
3) (1982).
114 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICs, PERSPECTIVES ON WORK-
iNG woMEN: A DATABOOK, Bulletin 2080, at 52 (table 52) (1980).
"s See generally Hartmann, Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex, 1 SIGNs
137 (Spring 1976).
116 D. CHAmBERs, supra note 10, at 52.
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ship between a wife's income and the duration of the marriage, as
on the average each thousand-dollar increase in a wife's earnings pro-
duces a one percent increase in the rate of separation."7 This
linkage appears less significant for Black women than for white
women, probably because Black women have been economically
forced into higher rates of labor force participation, at lower wages,
than white women. Thus their earnings are less likely to produce either
the perception or the reality of greater independence." 8
For the divorced woman with children, remarriage is the surest
method to achieve financial security. A survey of women from one
county in Michigan in the mid-1970's and a survey of Detroit women
in the 1940's both found that remarriage significantly increased
women's income. 9 The Detroit study found that the average week-
ly dollar amount available to a woman for expenses almost doubled
if she remarried. 2 The contemporary study found that the percen-
tage of family units consisting of employed mothers with children
living at the level of an intermediate budget 2' or higher (assuming
full compliance by the father with the child support award) increased
from sixty-two percent to eighty percent upon remarriage, and the
proportion at below the lower budget level dropped from fifteen per-
cent to four percent.'2
The trend in some jurisdictions toward holding stepfathers liable
for the support of their wives' children'2 also increases the pressure
on women to remarry, in order to acquire a provider for their children
more reliable than the typical absent father. This pressure is even
"
7 H. Ross & 1. SAWmiL, TmEm OF TRANsmoN: THE GROWTH OF FAMILIES HEADED BY
voMEN 57 (1975).
118 See Mott & Moore, The Causes and Consequences of Marital Breakdown, in VoMN,
WORK AND FAMILY 113 (F. Mott ed. 1978).
119 D. CHAMBERS, supra note 10, at 63-66; W. GOODE, supra note 22, at 230-36.
120 W. GOODE, supra note 22, at 231.
12' The intermediate budget level and the lower budget level are two standard budgets
adopted by the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics to measure the quality of
living. Chambers describes the intermediate budget as "'the modest but adequate' standard
attained by the average American urban working family." He includes in the lower standard
group all families (29 percent of the total) with incomes that fall below the Bureau of Labor
Statistics lower standard budget, which he uses as "the line below which most people would
feel they are living in poverty." D. CHAmBERs, supra note 10, at 43-44.
122 D. CnAmmERS, supra note 10, at 64.
123 E.g., Logan v. Logan, 120 N.H. 839, 424 A.2d 403 (1980) (Uniform Civil Liability For
Support Act imposes on stepparents a duty to support stepchildren equal to and coextensive
with duty to support natural children); Kaiser v. Kaiser, 93 Misc. 2d 36, 402 N.Y.S.2d 171
(Fain. Ct. 1978) (stepparent's statutory obligation ceases when remarriage ends for any reason);
Kelley v. Iowa Dept. Social Services, 197 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 1972) (Iowa common law obligates
stepparent living with stepchildren to support them).
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stronger if the divorced father has, by his own remarriage, acquired
new support obligations for stepchildren or children born in the new
marriage. Under basic cost-sharing principles, the expenses of his
"second family" will be seen to justify a reduction in the amount of
support he is ordered to pay for his original family. The only way
for the divorced mother to keep up in this cycle is to remarry. Policy
choices that minimize the child support to be'provided by the divorced
father strengthen the bonds that tie women to men and to marriage
as an institution.
The economic dependence caused by keeping the costs of divorce
private (and therefore imposing them on women) is apparently not
considered a problem by the "pro-family" forces of the far right.
Section 106 of the proposed Family Protection Act, 24 would make
divorce or child support even more difficult for poor women to ob-
tain, by prohibiting Legal Services representation in "any proceeding
or litigation seeking to obtain or arising out of a divorce." For poor
women, the ties that bind would thus become ever tighter.
Conservative theorist George Gilder, whose work enjoyed much
popularity at the beginning of the Reagan Administration, espouses
a more far-reaching theory of authoritarian family relationships.',
Gilder contends that the best way to promote family stability and
the general social good is to preserve explicitly male dominance within
the family."' He advocates deliberately lower salaries for employed
women, together with the payment of a family allowance to
"intact" 217 two-parent families irrespective of income." His method
is designed to keep mothers in the home and to foster the economic
viability of one-wage-earner families. Such right-wing support of a
family allowance policy usually considered to be a progressive income
redistribution mechanism signals, once again, that family policy con-
siderations for women and men differ greatly. Although a major goal
for women is to eliminate a system which hides the costs of childcare
in the private sector, it is essential that any policy which attempts
to allocate these costs socially do so in a way which does not rein-
force women's economic dependence on men.
'24 S. 1358, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S6329-44 (daily ed. June 17, 1981).
12 G. GILDER, SEXuAL SumcrE, (1973); see also G. GIDER, WNVEAL AND POVERTY (1981).
12 G. GUDEX, SEXuAL Sutcm, supra note 125, at 89-108, 191-204, 239-50.
127 Id. at 175.
1 Id. at 168-76.
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III. BUILDING THE BASIS FOR REFORM
Given the myriad problems plaguing the current child support
system, it comes as no surprise that many recommendations have
been made for its improvement. This section of the Article surveys
briefly suggestions for refinement of the present system, and then
examines proposals drawn largely from European systems that have
attempted major reforms.
There are a variety of improvements to the current system that
could be achieved by state legislative enactment, amendment of court
rules, or new decisional law. The most fundamental change would
be to adopt income-sharing formulae which seek to equalize between
the parents the relative burden of the increased costs of a split
household.'29 Other possible changes that would alleviate problems
of delay and nonenforcement include: imposing continuing wage
garnishments for the amount which is ordered, or wage assignments
which take effect whenever a payment is more than twenty days
overdue;'3° requiring that the father post security or bond to
guarantee payment;' 3' authorizing hearing officers to order payment
of retroactive support for any time period prior to the hearing dur-
ing which support was not paid;' creating referees or admin-
istrative agencies whose only responsibility would be to establish child
support amounts;' providing for attorneys' fees for contested
phases of a support determination; 34 and making promptly
'29 See supra notes 52-71 and accompanying text.
1"0 In North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin, statutes require that every order of
child support include an income assignment to cover the amount of support. N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 14-09-09.1 to 09.4 (1979 and Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 15-5-24, 15-5-25 to 27 (1980
and Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 2.055 (West Supp. 1982), §§ 767.23 and 767.265 (Vest
1979 and Supp. 1982). A number of states have laws similar to CAL. Crv. CODE § 4701 (West
1980), which provides for an income assignment order upon two-month arrearage. The
California statute was upheld in In re Marriage of DeMore, 93 Cal. App. 3d 785, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 899 (1979) (statute bearing rational relationship to valid state purpose survives due pro-
cess attack).
131 See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE § 4700 (West 1980 & 1982 Supp.); IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-15
(1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4 (1976 and Supp. 1981); In re Marriage of Davis, 395 N.E.2d
1254, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (courts afforded broad discretion by state statute in pro-
viding for security, bond, or other guarantee).
132 Patricia M.D. v. Alexis I.D., 442 A.2d 952 (Del. 1982) (retroactive support awards per-
missible under statute, up to two years prior to date petition is filed).
133 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.13, 767.29, 757.69 (West 1981 & Supp. 1982).
,34 CAL. CIv. CODE § 4370(c) (West 1980).
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available to non-AFDC recipients such programs as the parent locator
service.'
States have adopted many of these and other mechanisms for
enforcing support orders, primarily as a means of trimming welfare
costs. "'36 At the federal level, the Internal Revenue Service has
broadened the scope of its collection program-which makes seizure
of assets permissible-to encompass delinquent child support debts
owed to both AFDC recipients and nonrecipients. 37
The aforementioned reforms would improve the daily lives of
custodial mothers. None, however, addresses the problems -aised by
the current AFDC system,' nor alters the privatized structure of
family law which precludes government involvement in the sphere
where it is often most needed.'
The most far-reaching and thorough change in the American child
support system would be the adoption of supplemental family in-
come programs, such as those which operate in Sweden' and
France, 4 1 where the government pays.a fixed allowance to all
parents w#th cbildren. .Yet, a family allowance alone could function
as a. strong incentive for the woman in an ongoing marriage to re-
main at home, since it could be u.ed a a substitute for her earnings.
Upon divorce, the wife would be faced with an abrupt need to enter
the workforce despite a lack of job skills and experience. The French
have, however, attempted to lessen this effect by developing the most
extensive system of public childcare services in any Western European
country. 4 1 Widespread public childcare services allow divorced
women to share the burdens of childrearing with the state. In Sweden,
the government advances payments of private child support which
are due.'43 The amount of private child support in Sweden is deter-
135 Carter v. Morrow, 526 F. Supp. 1225 (W.D.N.C. 1981) (state agency failure to provide
all child support enforcement services, including legal representation, violated Social Secu-
rity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 654(b)).
136 Freed and Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview as of September, 1982,
8 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 4065 (Sept. 28, 1982).
137 IRS Child Support Collection Aid Broadened, 8 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2368 (April 27,
1982).
138 See supra notes 81-100 and accompanying text.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 101-105.
"0 Lijestrom, Sweden, in F~masn Poucy: GOVERNMENT AND FAmsns in FoURTmmN CouN-
TRms 19 (S. Kamerman & A. Kahn eds. 1978).
,4, Kamerman, Work and Family in Industrialized Societies, 4 SIGNs 632, 642 (1979).
4 2 Kamerman, supra note 141, at 642-43.
14 Garfinkel & Sorensen, The Swedish Child Support System: Lessons for the U.S., 27
SocIAj WoRK 509, 510 (1982).
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mined, as in the United States, in a judicial proceeding or by private
agreement, but is subject to a statutory minimum.'" When the
amount owed by the father is set by a court at less than the minimum,
the government makes up the difference from its general revenue
funds.145 Once the amount is set, the state will pay that sum each
month to the mother and assume responsibility for collecting from
the father. '
Although neither country's legal system appears to accept the prin-
ciple of equalizing the financial burden of divorce between mother
and father, the state itself absorbs much of the impact of divorce,
thus lessening the burden on women.
An American version of this kind of mixed public-private model
for child support at the state level has been proposed by Irwin
Garfinkel of the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University
of Wisconsin." 7 Garfinkel's plan combines a credit income tax with
a public child support payment program.'" Its child support com-
ponent would be financed by a tax imposed on the absent parent,
in an amount determined by that parent's income and the number
of children for whom support is owed. 9 It would be collected
through the same withholding method used for other taxes.Y0
Children whose fathers are indigent would be protected by a statutory
minimum amount, which would be financed by general state revenues
but distributed in the same manner-probably through a social ser-
vices agency-as support amounts collected from individual
fathers.'
If adopted at the federal level, this method would effectively
nationalize the private family system by bringing child support
payments under central control. By combining the private system with
AFDC, it would at least make less visible the "welfare" status of many
indigent families. But despite its potential to reduce this stigma, the
reform value of such a program would be limited if it did not pro-
144 Garfinkel & Sorensen, supra note 143, at 510-11.
"s Id. at 510.
'46 id.
4 I. GzA-un;ua, supra note 5; see also Garfinkel, Betson, Corbett and Zink, A Proposal
for Comprehensive Reform of the Child Support System in Wisconsin, in THE PARENrTAL CILD
SUPPORT OBLIGATION, supra note 50, at 263-82.
"8 I. GARFNKEL, supra note 5, at 12-13.
'41 Id. at 20-21.
"' Id. at 16-18.
"' Id. at 14-16.
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vide for reasonable minimum support amounts and eliminate coercive
methods of insuring the mother's "cooperation" in locating fathers.
The overall economic impact of such a system on women would
depend largely on how the formula used set the support obligations
of each parent. If the formula were structured to demand that both
parents contribute the identical proportion of their income to child
support, it would ultimately benefit women. But under Garfinkel's
plan, the only variables considered would be the noncustodial parent's
income and the number of children. Without giving consideratior
to the mother's income, it would be impossible to equalize the stan-
dard of living in the two households. Thus, while Garfinkel's plan
would benefit women by providing an absolute guarantee that sup-
port would'be paid, the inequity of how the burden is divided would
continue.
The Garfinkel proposal could serve as the basis for an intermediate
stage of reform. Like most partial improvements, however, its big-
gest danger is perhaps that it would be frozen into place as the last
effort to overhaul the system. A more thoroughgoing reform would
supplement Garfinkel's concepts with not only equalization of the
burden between the parents, but also an extensive public childcare
system, including a floor for support amounts, so that children
without support from a male wage earner would be guaranteed a
humane upbringing. These components are essential to any system
which would decrease women's economic dependence on men.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the child support system will not determine the extent
to which fathers begin to assume a greater role in childcare, in or
outside of marriage, and to demonstrate a stronger commitment to
continued financial support of their children. Only basic alterations
in social arrangements which significantly empower women, and
change relationships between women and men, will address the
underlying problems highlighted by the child support system. In the
meantime, child support programs should not be premised on assump-
tions of idealized paternal involvement in childrearing or economic
equality between men and women. Rather, child support reforms
should be designed to guarantee women with children economic
resources suffficient to allow them to achieve real autonomy; without
such autonomy, broader social change cannot occur.
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